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1. Introduction 
 
In What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psych logical categories (Griffiths, 
1997) I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that 
fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another 
to allow a unified scientific psy hology of the emotions. The psychological, 
neuroscientific and biological theories that best explain any particular subset of 
human emotions will not adequately explain all human emotions. In a slogan, 
emotions are not a natural kind (pp. 14-17; 241-247)i. I argued that the same is 
probably true of many specific emotion categories, such as anger and love (p. 17). 
On some occasions when a person is properly said to be angry, certain 
psychological, neuroscientific and biological theories will adequately explain what 
is happening to that person. On other occasions of anger, however, different 
theories will be needed. I described my position as eliminitivism about emotion, 
because it implies that the term ‘emotion’ and some specific emotion terms like 
‘anger’ are examples of what philosophers of language have called ‘partial 
reference’ (p. 242). The term ‘jade’ is the classic example of partial reference. The 
term ‘jade’ is used as if it referred to a particular kind of mineral, in the same 
manner as ‘malachite’ or ‘diamond’. In reality, however, the term covers two 
different stones, jadeite or nephrite. The term ‘jade’ partially refers to each of these 
two minerals. Hence, for the purposes of geology or chemistry, jade cannot be 
treated as a single kind of thing. The properties of the two substances have to be 
investigated separately, their geological origins explained separately and their 
abundance in unknown geological deposits predicted separately. Likewise, I 
argued, the sciences of the mind will have to develop separate theories of the 
various different kinds of emotion and also of the various different kinds of some 
particular emotions. In the same sense that there is really no such thing as jade, only 
jadeite and nephrite, there is no such thing as emotion, only ‘affect programs’, 
‘socially sustained pretences’ and other more specific categories of psychological 
state and process. 
 
While the critical response to my book has been generally positiveii, many 
philosophers remain unconvinced. I suspect that this is to a significant extent 
because the question of whether emotion is a natural kind has been conflated with 
the question of whether the concept of emotion can be given a univocal analysis. 
These two questions have very little to do with one another. Theconcept of a 
superlunary object can be analyzed — something is superlunary iff it is outside the 
orbit of the moon — but the consensus since Galileo has been that those things do 
not form a natural kind. Likewise, my claim was not that the vernacular concept of 
emotion is unanalyzable — I myself suggested a prototype analysis (pp. 242-245)
My claim was that the things that fall under the concept do not constitute a distinct 
kind for the purposes of scientific enquiry. The concept of ‘vitamin’ is a useful 
comparison. Vitamins are not, as was once thought, ‘vital amines’ but a diverse 
group of chemicals with diverse roles in physiology sharing the feature that humans 
cannot synthesize them, or can synthesize them, as with Vitamin D, only under 
advantageous environmental conditions. Their absence leads to ‘deficiency 
diseases’ with diverse etiologies and diverse prognoses. So the concept of a 
vitamin’ can be analysed, and individual vitamins and even some groups of 
vitamins are natural kinds, but ‘vitamin’ itself s a uperficial descriptive category. 
It is not a sensible scientific project to investigate the nature of vitamins in gener l. 
The question ‘what is a vitamin?’ is best answered by describing the main kinds of 
vitamin and how different they are from one another.  
 
Another important line of reply has been that it is a mistake to ask whether emotion 
and emotions are natural kinds at all, since they are primarily normative kinds 
(Doris, 2001). I have addressed this issue at length elsewhere (Griffiths, In Press-b). 
I wholeheartedly agree that the normative aspects of the semantics of emotion 
concepts are vital to an adequate account of those concepts, a view I endorsed in 
my book (pp. 7; 196-201). However, I do not accept that he normative uses of 
emotion concepts can be cleanly separated from the descriptive uses. Hence, the 
fact that emotion concepts are normative concepts does not mean that they are 
insulated from revision in the light of empirical discoveries about emotion  
 
In the remainder of this section I restate what I mean by ‘natural kind’ and my 
argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this sense. In the 
following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the 
emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the 
writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of 
emotional representations that draws on ‘multi-level appraisal theory’ in 
psychology. 
 
1.2 What do I mean by ‘natural kind’? 
I use the traditional term ‘natural kind’ to denote categories which admit of reliable 
extrapolation from samples of the category to the whole category. In other words, 
natural kinds are categories about which we can make scientific discoveries. In my 
book I built on the work of several other philosophers and scientists to construct an 
account of natural kinds in psychology and biology, an account further elaborated 
in (Griffiths, 1999, 2001a) and briefly sketched here.
 
The fundamental scientific practices of induction and explanation presume that 
some of the observable correlations between properties are ‘projectable’ (Goodman, 
1954). That is, correlations observed in a set of samples can be reliably ‘projct d’ 
to other instances of the category. Scientific classifications of particulars into 
categories embody our current understanding of where such projectable clusters of 
properties are to be found. The species category, for instance, classifies particular 
organisms into sets that represent reliable clusters of morphological, physiological 
and behavioral properties. Hence, these properties of the species as a whole can be 
discovered by studying a few members of the species.  
 
The traditional requirement that natural kinds be the subjects of universal, 
exceptionless ‘laws of nature’ is too strong and would leave few natural kinds in the 
biological and social sciences where generalizations are often exception-ridden or 
only locally valid. Fortunately, it is easy to generalize the idea of a law of nature to 
the broader idea that statements are to varying degrees ‘lawlike’ (have 
counterfactual force). This broader conception of a lawlike generalization allows a 
broader definition of a natural kind. A category is (minimally) natural if it is 
possible to make better than chance predictions about the properties of its instances. 
This, of course, is a very weak condition. Very many ways of classifying the world 
are minimally natural. The aim is to find categories that are a great deal more than 
minimally natural. Ideally, a natural kind should allow very reliable predictions in a 
large domain of properties. The classic examples of natural kinds, such as chemical 
elements and biological species, have these desirable features. 
 
It is important to note that categories are natural only relative to specific domain(s) 
of properties to which they are connected by background theories. The category of 
domestic pets is not a natural category for investigating morphology, physiology or 
behavior, but might be a natural category in some social psychological theory or, of 
course, in a theory about domestication. Emotion, I argue, is not a natural kind 
relative to the domains of properties that are the focus of investigation in 
psychol gy and the neurosciences. It is not the case that the psychological states 
and processes encompassed by the vernacular category of emotion form a category 
which allows extrapolation of psychological and neuroscientific findings about a 
sample of emotions to other emotions in a large enough domain of properties and 
with enough reliability to make emotion comparable to categories in other mature 
areas of the life sciences, such as biological systematics or the more robust parts of 
nosology. 
 
1.3 Why emotion s not a natural kind in this sense 
On some occasions when a person ‘has an emotion’ they are producing an affect 
program response - a ‘basic emotion’ in Paul Ekman’s sense. The response is short 
lived, highly automated, triggered in the early stages of processing perceptual 
information, and realized in anatomically ancient brain structures that we share with 
many other vertebrates. It is found in all human cultures and closely related to 
responses in other primates. Suppose, for example, that you are waiting in line 
outside a nightclub. After twenty minutes, someone unexpectedly pokes you 
sharply in the small of the back. You spin around, making a threat expression, 
probably the ‘square-mouthed’ variety, your body adjusts physiologically for 
violent action and your attention is entirely on your assailant. If the situation is 
rapidly defused (you are male and an attractive young woman has tripped against 
you and is smiling apologetically) then this will be a pure case of affect program 
anger. On other occasions, however, a person ‘having an emotion’ is responding in 
a more cognitively complex way to more highly analyzed information. The episode 
may or may not involve the occurrence of one or more affect program responses. 
Suppose, for example, that you are locked into a dysfunctional pattern of interaction 
with your spouse involving continual fault finding and put-dow s, this pattern 
emerging without any intention from the particular patterns of relationship 
management you both bring to the marriage. The pattern has resisted your 
occasional attempts to consciously improve your behavior and, as you reflect one 
day on what appears to be the inevitable degeneration of the relationship, you 
experience a deep sense of guilt and self-loathing. I referred to such states as 
‘higher cognitive emotions’. Finally, on some occasions, ‘having an emotion’ may 
centrally involve an internalized cultural model of appropriate behavior. In my 
book, I suggested that people who respond to losing their job by ‘going postal’ - 
going on a killing spree followed by attempted suicide - could be simultaneously 
‘out of control’ and following a ‘script’ derived from real and fictional incidents 
that are culturally salient for them. I presented a tentative analysis of such cases as 
‘socially sustained pretences’. 
 
My argument that emotion is not a natural kind rested mainly on the first two cases, 
the affect programs, or ‘basic emotions’ and the more cognitively complex 
emotions, which I termed ‘higher cognitive emotions’. I regret using the latter 
phrase, as it gives the impression that I have a substantive theory of those emotional 
responses. In fact, I discussed the views of leading theorists like Antonio Damasio 
(pp. 102-106) and Robert Frank (pp. 117-122) whose ideas clearly do something to 
illuminate these more complex emotions, but my only firm conclusion was that 
these states and processes are unlikely to be reduced to the basic emotions or 
understood as blends or elaborations of them. I accepted, however, that these other 
emotions may involve basic emotions as parts, depend on basic emotions for their 
development in the child, and interact with basic emotions in typical ways in real-
life situations. To better indicate how little we know about non-b sic em tions, I 
now prefer to call them ‘complex emotions’ (Griffiths, In Press-a, In Press-c). 
Finally, I rejected the view that the basic emotions are not emotions or that they are 
merely proto-emotions (pp. 26,164). This sort of procrustean treatment is inevitable 
as long as we insist that emotions are a single kind of thing. Instead, I suggested we 
should accept that there are two or more different kinds of psychological process 
involved in emotion, and if research into complex emotions suggests that, like basic 
emotions, they can be classified into emotion types, then there are two or more 
different kinds of emotions.iii 
 
The other major element of my case for ‘eliminating emotion’ was my specific 
account of natural kinds in biology. I have defended that account in numerous 
places (Griffiths, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) and can only 
briefly sketch it here. Evolution leads to the existence of two fundamental sets of 
biological categories - homologies and analogies. A homologue is “The same organ 
in different animals under every variety of form and function.” (Owen, 1843: 374), 
a definition interpreted since Darwin to mean that these organs are descended from 
a common ancestral form. Analogies are cases where two unrelated structres 
resemble one another because natural selection has adapted them for the same 
ecological role. My hips are homologous to those of a horse, but they are analogous 
to the articulation of an arthropod limb-pair with the rest of the arthropod segment. 
These two concepts have been routinely applied to behavior since the rise of 
ethology in the 1920s.  
 
I argued that some basic emotions are analogous to complex emotions that fall 
under the same vernacular category. The different kinds of fear, for example, are all
responses to danger. Any psychobiological theory of emotions in general, I 
suggested, would have to be a theory of psychological analogies — traits  that
fulfill the same functions in relation to the environment. The categories that would 
be generated by such a theory, although they might enter into useful ecological 
generalizations, would be systematically unsuited to the distinctive purposes of 
psychology and neuroscience. They would support induction and explanation on 
the wrong domain of properties (pp. 230-241). Suppose that two animals have 
homologous psychological traits, such as the basic emotion of fear in humans and 
fear in chimpanzees. We can predict that, even if the function of fear has been 
subtly altered by the different meaning of ‘danger’ for humans and for chimps, the 
computational methods used to process danger-related information will be very 
similar and the neural structures that implement them will be very similar indeed. 
After all, Joseph LeDoux’s widely accepted account of fear processing in the 
human brain is largely, and legitimately, based on the study of far more distantly 
homologous processes in the rat (L Doux, 1996). Now suppose that two animals 
have psychological traits that are analogous - fear in the rat and fear in the octopus, 
for example. It is a truism in comparative biology that similarities due to analogy 
(shared adaptive function) are ‘shallow’. The same problem can be solved in 
different ways and so the deeper you dig the more likely it is that mechani ms will 
diverge. Bat wings and bird wings, for example, have similar aerodynamic 
properties but their internal structure is radically different, reflecting their different 
ancestries. In contrast, similarities due to homology (shared ancestry) are 
notoriously ‘deep’: even when function has been transformed, the deeper you dig 
the more similarity there is in the underlying mechanisms. Threat displays in 
chimps look very different from anger in humans, but when their superficial 
appearance is analyzed to reveal the specific muscles whose movement produces 
the expression and the order in which those muscles move, it becomes clear that 
they are homologues of one another. The same is almost certainly true of the neural 
mechanisms that control those movements. 
 
Now, psychology is in the business of uncovering the mechanisms that produce 
behavior. This is even more evident in the case of neuropsychology. Hence these 
disciplines seek categories that are heuristically valuable for the study of underlying 
mechanisms. Inferences to shared mechanism based on homology are not 100% 
reliable, but they are reliable enough to build good science with - th  riterion I 
outlined above - and they are more reliable than inferences to shared mechanism 
based on analogy. I concluded that replacing the categories of basic emotion - 
which are explicitly categories of psychobiological homology - with more general 
categories that included any mechanism that performs the same broad adaptive 
function - would reduce the inductive and explanatory power of cognitive 
psychology and the neurosciences. It would be a move from a more natural 
category to a less natural category in the sense defined above. The aims of these 
sciences are better served by recognizing that there is more than one kind of 
emotion and by investigating each on its own terms. 
 
Having summarized my arguments or the view that emotions do not form a natural 
kind, I now go on to consider the most promising proposals for the opposite view. 
 
 
2. Affective Neuroscience and the Cat gory of Emotion 
2.1. Are complex emotions blends of basic emotions?
Innumerable theorists have suggested that complex emotions are blends of basic 
emotions. In my book I argued that some of the features that characterize complex 
emotions cannot be accounted for merely by supposing that several basic emotions 
occur simultaneously or in sequence. First, it is characteristic of some complex 
emotions that they occur in response to complex properties of the stimulus situation 
and so need a more sophisticated appraisal of the environment than would be 
obtained by adding together the appraisal criteria for the basic emotions: 
“Situations that elicit sexual jealousy or moral indignation do not differ from each 
other merely in the proportions of anger, conspecific chall nge, noxiousness and 
loss that they involve” (Griffiths, 1997: 102). Secondly, some complex emotions 
endure much longer than the basic emotions. What is more, they endure as real 
psychological processes, not mere dispositions. When a woman’s feeling of guilt 
explains her behavior through a long session of negotiation with her husband and 
their lawyers, it does more than dispose her to intermittently display affect-program 
sadness and affect program fear. Thirdly, basic emotions have behavior l 
consequences of the sort detected by the facial affect coding system. I denied that 
all complex emotions result in blends of the facial action associated with the known 
basic emotions. Finally, while basic emotions have reciprocal interactions with 
more complex cognitive processes, some complex emotions are more directly 
involved in the control of long-term, planned action. The woman’s guilt in the 
example just given is arguably an intimate part of the thought processes by which 
she arrives at a decision on which demands to concede and which to resist.  
 
The proposal that complex emotions involve blends of basic emotions is more 
promising when conjoined to the idea that complex emotions involve additional 
cognitive activity. The idea that complex e otions are elaborations of basic 
emotions resulting from the integration of activity in phylogenetically ancient brain 
structures with activity in the neocortex is currently the most popular proposal to 
reintegrate the domain of emotion. This is largely because of the work of the 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 1999). Jesse Prinz has 
captured the spirit of this approach with the analogy that basic emotions are shots of 
hard liquor and complex emotions are cocktails in which specific hard liquors are 
mixed with specific non-alcoholic ingredients (Prinz, 2000). The basic emotion is 
the motivational ‘kick’ in each complex emotional cocktail.  
 
2.2. Emotion and affective neuroscience 
The ‘cognitive elaboration’ view is a promising approach to complex emotions, 
provided it is borne in mind that basic emotions are themselves emotions and not 
only constituents of complex emotion, and that basic emotions and complex 
emotions are very different from one another. It is all too easy to gloss over these 
differences. Simon Blackburn, for example, has argued that Damasio’s work refutes 
my claim that emotion is not a natural kind because, 
 
“Empirically, the suggestion that we split the operation of the affect 
program from ‘higher cognitive emotion’ seems to ignore the most 
fascinating result of Damasio’s work, which is the extent to which ‘higher-
order’ decision making has to harness the limbic system in order to work at 
all.” (Blackburn, 1998, 129).  
 
But, empirically, the operation of two kinds of emotions can be split, whether this 
occurs in pathologies like phobias or in the phenomena reported in the literature on 
‘affective primacy’ (Öhman, 1999, 2002; Zajonc, 1980). Basic emoti ns can occur 
without the accompanying activity in the neo-cortex and basic emotion appraisal 
processes can reach conclusions contradictory to those reached by full-blown 
cognitive appraisal of the stimulus situation. Furthermore, there is a longstanding 
consensus in the literature on the evolution of emotion that this is why humans still 
have basic emotions. Basic emotions are rapid acting, failsafe devices that produce 
evolved behavioral, physiological and cognitive r sponses tailored to certain critical 
features of the environment. They are faster and more reliable than the slower, but 
arguably more accurate responses that we make using our recently evolved neo-
cortical resources. This, of course, is entirely consistent with Damasio’s claims 
about the role of the emotions in rational decision-making. That role makes use of 
one of the outputs of the basic emotional response, which, Damasio argues, is a 
representation of the physiological changes that have been produced by that initial 
emotional response. Other outputs to cognition from the basic emotion process 
include orienting sensory systems to the emotional stimulus and allocating 
attentional resources to that stimulus. 
 
I suspect Blackburn is less interested in whether basic emotions can occur without 
complex emotions, than in whether complex emotions can occur without basic 
emotions and thus whether all emotions share a set of core processes. In fact, 
according to philosopher Louis Charland, a fair-minded reading of contemporary 
affective neuroscience makes it quite clear that all emotions do, indeed, share a 
single kind of core process. Affective neuroscience, he argues, provides a general 
theory of the nature of ‘emoters’, or ‘affective systems’. These are, “a distinct class 
of biological systems whose behavior is largely governed by emotion and only 
explainable in those terms. This is the neurobiological version of the hypothesis 
that emotion is a natural kind term.’ (Charland, 2001: 151-2). Charland is referring 
in part to the idea elaborated by the neuroscientist Paul D. Maclean in a series of 
publications from the 1950s to the 1980s that emotion is a distinctive form of 
information processing which we have inherited from our distant evolutionary 
ancestors, and which manifests itself o u  as what we call emotion ‘feelings’. 
These processes are realized in phylogenetically ancient anatomical regions 
surrounding the brainstem, regions that Maclean termed the ‘limbic brain’. 
Charland notes that the leading contemporary neuroscientist of emotion Joseph 
LeDoux regards the limbic brain concept as more or less anatomically and 
functionally meaningless, but he sets against this the fact that LeDoux’s 
experimental work has dealt only with one emotion - f ar - and that his views are 
not shared by all other neuroscientists. The views of another leading neuroscientist 
of emotion, Jaak Panksepp, are more congenial to Charland. Panksepp accepts that 
MacLean’s concept of an ‘emotional brain’ is oversimplified, but defends the 
underlying concept that emotion represents an ancient form of information 
processing that we share with many other species. In Charland’s view, the work of 
Panksepp, Damasio and others suggests very strongly that there is a single, natural 
kind of psychological process that generes affect. He takes it to be obvious that 
we should identify the category of emotion with this class of ‘affective’ processes. 
 
I am sympathetic to the view that the basic emotions represent a distinctive form of 
information processing that humans share with many other animals (Griffiths, 
1997: 91-97) but I have argued that identifying the emotions with that form of 
processing would amount to a substantive and stipulative revision of the vernacular 
concept of emotion (pp. 230-234). This revision would both exclude some things 
that are in the vernacular category and include some things that are not in the 
vernacular category. In my book I was concerned to leave room for the possibility 
that some complex emotions may not involve basic emotions, or ay involve them 
only peripherallyiv. I still think it is important not to foreclose that issue, but here I 
will concentrate on the opposite problem, namely that the new category is too 
inclusive to be simply identified with the vernacular category. There is, of course, 
nothing wrong with scientists deciding to use the term ‘emotion’ in a revised sense, 
and most leading emotion neuroscientists seem to be aware that they are in the 
business of productive stipulation, not conceptual analysis. In his own response to 
my claim that emotion is not a natural kind, Damasio remarks: 
 
“At this point, my preference is to retain the traditional nomenclature, 
clarify the use of the terms, and wait until further evidence dictates a new 
classification, my hope being that by maintaining some continuity we will 
facilitate communication at this transitional stage. I will talk about three 
levels of emotion - background, primary and secondary. This is 
revolutionary enough, given that background emotions are not part of the 
usual roster of emotions.” (Damasio, 1999, 341) 
 
Thus, rather than vindicating the vernacular category of emotion Damasio is 
recruiting the old term for a new and more general category. This category covers 
phylogenetically ancient ‘primary emotions’ (basic emotions), ‘secondary 
emotions’ that are elaborations of these ancient responses into complex and 
variegated responses that involve substantial areas of the neo-cortex and uniquely 
human cognitive abilities (similar to my ‘complex emotions’), and background 
emotions, which are the ever-present awareness of our own body.  
 
This perspective on how affective neuroscience uses the emotion category is 
reinforced by the way in which the discipline treats basic drives like hunger and 
thirst, and hedonic states like pain and pleasure. Panksepp remarks that he will 
follow tradition in distinguishing between emotions proper and drives which 
regulate some specific state of the body, and thus that he will not initially consider 
hunger, thirst or disgust to be emotions. But this distinction, he remarks, will 
become ‘less defensible’ in later chapters of his book (Panksepp, 1998, 47, 342 note 
17). In the same vein, Damasio remarks that, “I will refer to drives and motivations 
and pain and pleasure as triggers or constituents of emotions, but not as emotions in 
the proper sense. No doubt all these devices are intended to regulate life, but it is 
arguable that emotions are more complex...” (p. 341).  These remarks exemplify a 
research strategy that I take to be central to much recent work on the emotions. 
Panksepp and Damasio take the domain of affective neuroscience to be all mental 
processes that involve affective feelings.  Panksepp has described this as ‘the basic 
psychological criteria th t emotional systems should be capable of elaborating 
subjective feeling states that are affectively valenced’ (Panksepp, 1998, 48). But 
this domain is both much broader than the vernacular category of emotion and 
somewhat difficult to work with in practice, because subjective feeling states ‘have 
so far defied neural specification’ (p. 48). In practice, then, emotions are defined as 
that class of affective processes that have certain distinctive performance features: 
 
“(1) Various sensory stimuli can unconditionally access emotional systems; 
(2) Emotional systems can generate instinctual motor outputs, as well as; (3) 
modulate sensory inputs. (4) Emotional systems have positive feedback 
components that can sustain emotional arousal after precipitating events 
have passed. (5) These systems can be modulated by cognitive inputs and 
(6) can modify and channel cognitive activities.” (Panksepp, 1998: 48) 
 
A comparison of these criteria with descriptions of the distinctive features of affect 
programs or basic emotions in the Tomkins-Izard-Ekman tradition reveals striking 
similarities (Griffiths, 1997, 77-99). In both research traditions, emotion is being 
conceived as information processing that is somehow simpler than paradigm 
examples of cognition, perhaps because it involves bodily feelings rather than 
explicit representations of external states of affairs, but which is nevertheless more 
complex than tropisms, reflexes and homeostatic drives. In my book I used Paul 
Ekman’s argument that the startle reaction is not an emotion as a paradigm of what 
it takes to establish that some reaction is a basic emotion (Ekman, Friesen, & 
Simons, 1985). Ekman and his collaborators argue that the startle reaction is too 
reflex-like to count as an affect program and I commented that, “This suggests that 
the information processing arrangements underlying startle are not of the same sort 
as those underlying affect programs. ... Extending the concept of an affect program 
state to cover it would not be a positive step in theory construction, since findings 
about startle may not be true of the affect program states and vice-versa.” (Griffiths, 
1997, 241; see also Robinson, 1995). 
 
In my view, what Charland fails to appreciate is that the category of felt affective 
states is very large, and certainly larger than the existing vernacular category of 
emotion. In addition to classic emotions like anger and joy, it will include drive 
states like hunger and thirst, edonic states like pain and pleasure, and the 
ubiquitous awareness of bodily states that Damasio calls ‘background emotion’. 
Furthermore, given the strong connection between motivation and affect made by 
writers like Damasio, the category of felt affective states probably includes desires 
and preferences. Blackburn, for example, has argued that the motivational power of 
our long-term goals reflects an emotional commitment to those goals and cites with 
approval Damasio’s idea that our awareness of the body is the motive power of 
practical reason (Blackburn, 1998, 129). Because the category of felt affective 
states is so broad, it is natural within this framework to seek distinctive kinds of 
processes involving affective feelings. Hence, I suggest that rather than 
demonstrating that emotions are a natural kind, the empirical success of current 
approaches to affective neuroscience would establish that there is a very large 
domain of affective and motivational phenomena, within which we could 
distinguish categories of state and process such as Damasio’s background emotions, 
primary emotions and secondary emotions, homeostatic drives, and pure hedonic 
states like pain and pleasure. The scientific domain of affective neuroscience would 
be like the scientific domain of chemistry, where atoms and their bonds are at the 
basis of everything, but where lumping together mixtures, compounds, alloys, pure 
elements and pure isotopes on the grounds that they are all ‘chemical substances’ is 
not very helpful. Making and exploring those distinctions was essential to the 
development of modern chemistry and I suggest that the same will be true of 
affective neuroscience. 
 
 
3. Multi-level Appraisal Theory and the Content of Emotional Representations 
3.1 Appraisal and the philosophy of emotion 
Appraisal theories are the closest scientific equivalents of the theories that have 
dominated philosophy of emotion since the 1960s. Like appraisal theorists, 
philosophers have sought to understand emotions in terms of the si uations at 
elicit them. Emotions have been analyzed as states with specific ‘formal objects’ 
(Kenny, 1963), as evaluative judgments (Solomon, 1976), as evaluative judgments 
that cause bodily arousal (Lyons, 1980), as feelings of comfort or discomfort 
directed towards an evaluative thought (Greenspan, 1988) and as the results of 
either true belief or uncertainty about emotion-inducing situations (Gordon, 1987). 
For these and many other authors, the central aim of a philosophical theory of 
emotion is to identify the content of an emotion: the actual or imagined state of 
affairs in the world that corresponds to that emotion. 
 
Appraisal theories aim to identify the features of n emotion-eliciting situation that 
lead to the production of one emotion rather than another  (Scherer, 1999). Typical 
appraisal theories include a set of dimensions against which potentially emotion-
eliciting situations are assessed. The imensions of the emotion hyperspace might 
include, for example, whether the eliciting situation fulfills or frustrates the 
subject’s goals or whether an actor in the eliciting situation has violated a norm. 
Richard Lazarus’s well-known model of emotional appraisal has six dimensions, 
and the regions of the resulting hyperspace that correspond to particular emotions 
are summarized by Lazarus as the ‘core relational themes’ of those emotions. 
Anger, for examples, is elicited by the core relational theme ‘a dem aning offence 
against me and mine’, sadness by ‘having experienced an irrevocable loss’, and 
guilt by ‘having transgressed a moral imperative’ (Laz rus, 1991). These themes 
correspond to each emotion’s ‘content’ in philosophical theories of emotion. 
 
The ongoing effort to test appraisal theories has produced a consensus that actual 
emotional responses do not walk in step with subjects’ evaluation of stimulus 
situations unless the notion of ‘cognitive evaluation’ is broadened to inclu  sub-
personal processes (Teasdale, 1999). Many appraisal theorists have come to accept 
that even such apparently conceptually complex appraisals as Lazarus’s core 
relational themes can be assessed: 1. Without the information evaluated being 
available to other cognitive processes, 2. Before perceptual processing of the 
stimulus has been completed, and 3. Using only simple, sensory cues to define 
where the eliciting situation falls on the dimensions. These conclusions are 
congruent with both the older literature on ‘affective primacy’ (Öhman, 1999, 
2002; Zajonc, 1980) and with the recent mapping of multiple neural pathways to 
the same emotional response (LeDoux, 1996; LeDoux, 1993). 
 
One of the reasons philosophers remain convinced that emotion is a natural kind is 
their belief that, however psychologically different the various instances of anger or 
any other emotion may be, every instance shares the same or similar content. 
Moreover, the general category of emotion is unified by the fact that all emotions 
have a certain broad kind of evaluative content. Thus, to take a prominent recent 
example, Martha Nussbaum argues that emotions are all of one kind because they 
are all ‘intelligent responses to the perception of value’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 1). In 
defending this view she draws on psychologist Richard Lazarus’s classical 
presentation of appraisal theory, which she describes as ‘in all essentials the view of 
emotions I have defended in Chapter 1’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 109). Nussbaum’s 
treatment of the emotions in children and animals also makes use of something like 
multi-level appraisal. Animals as well as humans make the evaluative judgments 
that constitute emotions according to Nussbaum’s theory, but they do so without 
self-conscious awareness and in such a way that the content of their judgments 
cannot be rendered in language without distortion. Nevertheless, she argues, 
emotion remains primarily an intentional phenomenon. Despite the existence of 
low-level appraisal that cannot be expressed in language, ‘...emotions include in 
their content judgments that can be true or false, and good or bad guides to ethical 
choice’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 1).  
 
“What we need, in short, is a multifaceted notion of cognitive interpretation 
or seeing-as, accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality that allows 
us to ascribe to a creature more or less precise, vaguer or more demarcated, 
ways of intending an object and marking it as salien .” (Nussbaum, 2001: 
129)  
 
Nussbaum’s description of what is needed for an adequate account of emotional 
cognition is compelling, but levels of appraisal do not just differ between 
organisms. They also differ within a single organism. Multi-level models of 
emotional appraisal suggest that the same stimulus can be represented in several 
places in the human brain by different representations. Hence it is vital to 
understand not only what these multiple appraisals have in common, but also how 
they differ and how they interact. The existence of multiple representations in a 
‘hierarchical’ emotional architecture (Delancey, 2001) violates a key assumption of 
most philosophical reasoning about emotion, which is that emotional cogniti n 
manipulates emotional representations on the basis of their content, and thus that 
emotional processes can be explored via the semantic ‘logic’ of emotions: 
 
‘all emotions presuppose or have as their preconditions, certain sorts of 
cognitions - an awareness of danger in fear, recognition of an offense in 
anger, appreciation of someone or something as lovable in love. Even the 
most hard-headed neurological or behavioral theory must take account of 
the fact that no matter what the neurology or the behavior, if a person is 
demonstrably ignorant of a certain state of affairs or facts, he or she cannot 
have certain emotions.’ (Solomon, 1993: 11).  
 
Multi-level models imply that this picture is too simple. How emotional and other 
representations interact, if they interact at all, depends on details of cognitive 
architecture as well as on the content of the representations. This architecture, of 
course, cannot be determined by studying the conceptual relations between the 
contents of emotional representations. Phobias and affective primacy phenomena 
provide insight into the architecture of the emotion system by revealing that certain 
information, such as partially analyzed visual data, is available to low-level 
appraisal but not to high-level appraisalv. A complimentary insight is provided by 
people with ‘flattened affect’, who are apparently able to carry out high-level 
appraisal but not low-level appraisal and who do not experience the physiological 
components of normal emotional response. The possibility of flattened affect 
without intellectual impairment reveals that only low-leve  appraisal has direct 
connections to the effector systems for the automated components of rapid 
emotional response.  
 
Normal human emotion involves several subsystems that interact, and interact with 
other cognitive subsystems, in ways that reflect the particular cognitive architecture 
in which they are embedded. Nussbaum suggests that we can cope with this 
phenomenon using a ‘flexible notion of intentionality’. This is supposed to allow us 
to identify what is in common between animal and human emotion. The suggestion 
is presumably that there is some degree of isomorphism between the way in which 
high-level representations relate to one another on the basis of their content and the 
way in which low-level representations relate to one another of the basis of their 
‘content’. Thus, the ‘logic’ of the emotion will be the same in the two cases. But in 
my view, there are likely to be more radical differences between the 
representational states involved in low-leve  and high-level appraisal. Ruth Millikan 
has suggested that mental representations in simple organisms may unite the 
functions of beliefs and desires (Millikan, 1996). Low-level appraisal in humans 
seems to manifest the same ‘collapse of the attitudes’. Consider the low-level 
appraisal of the core relational theme ‘a demeaning offence to me and mine’ that 
presumably occurs when a soccer player is dribbling the ball down the field, 
another player grabs his jersey causing him to lose the ball, and the first player 
turns angrily towards the second. It is misleading to say that the relevant brain 
region believes that the core relational theme has been instantiated. Beliefs are 
mental states that repres nt how things are and which produce action in conjunction 
with desires - representations of how the world should be. But in low-level 
appraisal for anger there is no question as to what action will be taken. The 
frustrated player in our example will orient to the stimulus, produce the pan-cultural 
facial expression of anger and undergo physiological changes to prepare them for 
aggressive action.  The ‘affective computation’ in this example is simultaneously 
the belief that the world is a particular way and the intention to act in a particular 
way. Likewise for the better understood case of affective computing of fear in the 
amygdala, and, presumably, for any emotion that has a clear behavioral signature 
and can be induced to exhibit affective primacy. I suggest that it is simply 
misleading to describe low-level appraisal as evaluative judgment, or using any 
other locution derived from a psychology that presumes a fundamental distinction 
between data and goals. Instead, low-leve  emotional appraisal seems to involve 
action-oriented representation (Griffiths, In Press-c; Scarantino, In Press). 
 
Another way in which low- evel emotional appraisal may differ from high-level s 
in terms of the narrow inferential role imposed on low-l vel representations by the 
task-specific architecture in which they occur. The inferential role of these 
representations is impoverished in three ways. First, low-level appraisal processes 
do not have access to most of what is represented elsewhere in the brain, which is 
why knowledge that the cockroach in my drink has been completely sterilized does 
not eliminate the disgust response. Hence, many inferences that would seem to 
follow from the content we ascribe to this low-level appraisal — ‘I am taking in or 
being too close to an indigestible object’ — are not actually made by subjects 
because they cannot recombine that content appropriately with their other 
contentful states. Secondly, the processes of affective computing, as opposed to 
their final output, are not available for inspection by other cognitive sub-systems. 
Once again, architectural barriers to information flow block inferences that follow 
from what would otherwise seem the natural content to ascribe to those states. 
Finally, the inferential principles used in affective computing are not truth-
preserving, but heuristically survival-enhancing. It does not follow by any 
reasonable deduction that if I have been poked hard and unexpectedly in the small 
of my back then I have suffered ‘a demeaning offence to me and mine’ but the 
automatic appraisal mechanism for anger will reliably draw that conclusionvi. 
 
If the concepts that figure in the content ascribed to a representation do not have 
their usual inferential role, then what is meant by attributing that content? The 
differences between the role of the representations involved in low-level appraisal 
and the inferential role of the content-se ces with which we describe those 
appraisals throws strongly suggests that, at least when applied to these low level 
processes, appraisal theories are not theories of cognitive content. I have suggested 
elsewhere that they are theories of the ecological significance of the environment to 
the organism (Griffiths, In Press-c). That significance is tracked by multiple 
cognitive subsystems using different environmental cues and different 
psychological and neurological mechanisms. Thi , of course, returns us to the main 
theme of this paper, which is that the states and processes we call ‘emotion’ are not 
all of the same kind. 
 
4. Conclusion: Why emotion is still not a natural kind and why it matters 
 
I have defended the thesis that the psychological states and processes that fall under 
the vernacular concept of emotion are unlikely to be a single ‘natural kind’. I 
believe that the same is probably true of some specific vernacular categories of 
emotion, although I have not defended that view here. I have considered two main 
alternatives. The first is that the emotions are simply those of states and processes 
studied in ‘affective neuroscience’. I have argued that, if empirically successful, 
current approaches to affective neuroscience will define a much larger class of 
affective and motivational processes, united by the role in all these processes of felt 
affect. I also think it is important not to foreclose the possibility that some emotions 
do not involve the basic emotions, or involve them only peripherally, although I 
have  not argued for this here. 
 
The second suggestion was that emotions are appraisals of the significance of the 
environment to the organism. I agree that multi-level appraisal theory brings many 
different kinds of emotion under a single taxonomic scheme, but I have argued that 
does so precisely by abstracting away from the kind of psychological processes th t
constitute those emotions. A theory of emotions based on their content is not a 
psychological theory, but an ecological theory, as I have argued at more length 
elsewhere (Griffiths In Press-c). 
 
It is reasonable to ask why the claim that emotion is not a natural kind matters to 
philosophy? The simple answer is that many philosophers still take it to be their 
role to provide an account of the genesis, development and consequences of a 
‘typical’ human emotion (e.g. Wollheim, 1999). If I am correct, then there is no 
such thing as a typical emotion. Instead, there are different kinds of emotion, or of 
emotional process, each of which should be treated in its own terms and whose 
various possible interactions should be studied. Similarly, the idea that all emotions 
are intentionally directed at aspects of the environment i  the same sense, i  a core 
methodological assumption of much current philosophical work on the emotions. If 
I am correct, then we should be more concerned with the distinc ive properties of 
the different kinds of emotional intentionality and with how these different kinds of 
emotion process interact in real emotional episodes. Cases in which people have an 
emotion in one sense and do not have it in another should be as illuminating for the 
philosophy of psychology as they have been for psychology itself. 
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* To appear in Philosophers on Emotion, Robert Solomon (ed). Oxford University Press. 
i Page numbers without citations refer to Griffiths (1997). 
ii E.g. Nature, 391, 1998; Times Literary Supplement July 17 1998; Philosophy in Review 18, 1998; 
Australian’s Review of Books, April 1998; Metascience 8 (1) 1999; Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 77 (4) 1999; Philosophical Review, 108 (1) 1999; American Journal of Psychology, Fall 
2000: 472-478; Dialogue 38 (4) 2000.  
iii I take this to be an open question. Many psychologists of emotion reject the idea that emotions 
come in discrete types and support instead a dimensional account of the emotion system. Even if 
basic emotions form discrete types, the best theory of complex emotions might still be dimensional 
rather than typological. 
                                                                                                           
iv  One reason I take this possibility seriously is that contemporary research in evolutionary 
psychology does not proceed under the assumption that all emotions are composed of or have at 
their core one of the basic emotions. In fact, so- alled ‘Santa-Barbara school’ evolutionary 
psychologists make considerable play of the claim that ‘all emotions are equally basic’ (Buss, 2000; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Gaulin & McBurney, 2001). These researchers define an emotional 
adaptation as any motivational mechanism designed to influence behavior in some specific problem 
domain and whose operation cannot be understood as the application of domain-general pr cesses to 
that problem. Their commitment to the ‘massive modularity hypothesis’ makes them suspicious of 
attempts to explain all specific emotions via the interaction of a smaller number of general-p rpose 
mechanisms, such as the basic emotions and our capacity for cognitive evaluation of stimulus 
situations.  
v I do not think it is yet clear how many appraisal levels are needed for an adequate representation of 
emotional appraisal. When I talk of ‘low’ and ‘high’ levels I do not mean to imply that there are just 
two levels of appraisal, but rather to mark the existence of a dimension of difference. 
vi Some would say that the appraisal mechanism has ‘innate knowledge’ that this cue reliably 
predicted conspecific aggression in ancestral environment (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), but the 
scientific substance of this claim is simply that the appraisal mechanism consistently makes certain 
inferences. 
